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This text, occasioned by a critical reading of Tony Brown’s new book Mathematics 
Education and Subjectivity, aims at contributing to the building of a sociopolitical approach 
to mathematics education based on Lacanian psychoanalysis and Slavoj Žižek’s philosophy. 
Brown has been bringing into the field of mathematics education the work of these two 
scholars, and his work has been important in understanding the cultural dynamics of school 
mathematics. This article highlights the limitations of Brown’s use of Lacanian theory, and 
outlines a framework to understand students’ learning not in terms of the inherent properties 
of mathematics, but in terms of the role this school subject plays within political economy.  
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1. Introduction 
Mathematics education as a field of research has been historically dominated by a discourse 
that orbits around the development of better stratagems to teach and learn mathematics, and 
emphasizes mathematics and the psychology of the child as the primary theoretical and 
methodological frameworks. In the last 20 years, some researchers have been criticizing such 
an approach, arguing that many of the problems that students and teachers experience in 
schools cannot be reduced to a solely mathematical or psychological hindrance. As recently 
expressed by Morgan (2014), in one of this journal’s special issues dedicated to social theory, 
the use of socially and politically oriented research frameworks results not from a will to 
satisfy some theoretical caprice or to implement an innovative methodology, but from the 
need for a broader and richer understanding of many of the problems experienced by students 
and teachers in their daily work. When we start posing what Morgan calls ‘unsophisticated 
questions’ such as ‘Why in a class of thirty students will there always be some (or many) who 
fail?’, ‘Why are teachers asked to mark students?’, or ‘Why does school mathematics 
function so efficiently as a gatekeeper?’ then you will hardly find any answer in research. 
These questions resist any straightforward investigation. Yet they make us aware that the 
solutions for the problems of failure in school mathematics cannot be solved within 
mathematics education alone. For all students to have a chance, something will have to 
change elsewhere. It is precisely this ‘elsewhere’ – the entire sociopolitical arena that 
schematizes what it means to teach and learn mathematics – that social theory potentially 
brings into the research gaze.  
Against this background, Tony Brown’s work has been vital in positioning the problems 
that students and teachers feel in their daily school lives at a level where broader social 
systems can be considered. In his work, such a move was accompanied by an emphasis on 
contemporary theory as a privileged framework to analyse some of the core issues in 
mathematics education research. Scholars such as Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, Ricoeur, 
Habermas and, more recently, Lacan, Badiou and Žižek, have been used by Brown to analyse 
how teachers (e.g. Brown & McNamara, 2011), students (e.g. Brown, 2001) and researchers 
(e.g., Brown, 2008b) make sense of their worlds. The theories of these scholars have allowed 
Brown to conceptualize mathematics education as more than the encounter between an 
individual and a mathematical object. This is particularly important given the realisation that 
many of the problems that students and teachers experience in their school lives are not 
‘didactical’ ones, in the sense that they can be approached through better stratagems to learn 
and teach mathematics, but political ones, having to do with the sociopolitical organization of 
schooling (Brown & McNamara, 2011; Gutiérrez, 2010; Pais & Valero, 2012; Valero, 2004).  
How to develop theoretical frameworks where such political dimension can be taken into 
account has been one of the major concerns in Brown’s work. Furthermore, Brown’s research 
not only provides fresh theoretical insights into mathematics education, but it does so through 
a critical dialogue with other theoretical approaches prevailing in the field, such as Piagetian 
and Vygotskian psychologies (Brown, 2008a). Thus, it is not surprising that in the last five 
years Brown’s theoretical developments have been the target of thoughtful criticism from 
researchers resistant to some of the contemporary scholars used by Brown in his work, 
particularly the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (Presmeg & Radford, 2008; Roth, 
2012).  
Brown’s recent book, Mathematics Education and Subjectivity, offers the reader an 
account of this ongoing discussion concerning the issue of subjectivity in mathematics 
education1 – chapters 5, 6 and 7 draw on material originally published in Educational Studies 
in Mathematics, where Brown confronts Lacan’s theory of the subject with Piaget’s and 
Vygotsky’s theories. Furthermore, Brown draws on the contemporary reading of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis carried out by the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek to analyse how 
political structures shape teachers, students and mathematics. Far from offering technical 
solutions to current models of practice, Brown’s book seeks to enlarge the scope of research 
in mathematics education, by bringing into discussion many of the most recent developments 
within contemporary theory, around the two central topics of subjectivity and change.  
Brown’s criticism hits at the core of a certain mathematics education research ‘where 
standalone “humans” apprehend distinct mathematical “concepts”’ (2011, p. 2). Through his 
engagement with Lacanian theory, Brown invites us to conceptualize humans as more than 
knowing subjects; it invites us to conceptualize humans as desiring subjects, with all the 
sociopolitical charge that desire has within Lacanian theory, as I shall explore in the 
following pages. Moreover, Brown contests the linearity that is assumed between research 
and practice (p. 96). Although a common feature of mathematics education research is the 
elaboration of ‘recipes’ (Sriraman & English, 2010, p. 27) for the problems of practice, not 
much is said about the social and political conditions that have to be met so that such recipes 
can actually become a force of change. Such conditions are usually taken for granted – by 
providing images of schools, students and teachers that may not be lived up to in real life – or 
discarded as being beyond the scope of researchers’ endeavours (e.g. Abreu, Bishop & 
Presmeg, 2002). Brown’s research not only brings such vicissitudes into the research gaze, it 
also calls researchers’ attention to the role that theory has in constituting what is perceived as 
the reality of school mathematics.  
The fact that Brown’s research has been causing such an enthusiastic response by 
scholars such as Wolff-Michael Roth, Luis Radford and Norma Presmeg proves that he is 
touching important nerves of mathematics education research. Presmeg and Radford (2008) 
and later Roth (2012), criticized Brown’s reading of sociocultural theories, and pointed out 
the benefits of socioculturalism and the flaws of Lacanian theory for theorizing the teaching 
and learning of mathematics. While these scholars criticized Brown’s developments from the 
standpoint of socioculturalism, I am interested in questioning Brown’s work from the point of 
                                                          
1 A few months after the publication of Brown’s book, Wolff-Michael Roth published a critical reading of the 
book (Roth, 2012), to which Brown responded in return (Brown, 2012).  
view of Lacanian theory itself.2 In my quest to understand the problems I felt as a teacher, I 
also became engaged with Lacanian psychoanalysis and Žižek’s philosophy, and I truly 
believe that the axis Lacan–Žižek can bring researchers closer to the complex problems that 
students and teachers experience in schools. I am, however, suspicious about the emphasis 
given by Brown to culture as the locus of change. Lacan himself avoids the term culture and, 
when referring to it, does it in a quite dishonoured way. Within the Lacanian framework, 
culture is a kind of shit-disposal system of society (Lacan, 2008a, pp. 65–75). That is, it 
provides the necessary decorum for what is repressed. In this sense, culture and ideology are 
not different: they both serve the purpose of evacuating shit, understood as what needs to be 
repressed so that a sense of social cohesion can be kept. Culture homogenises what is 
presented as a threat to this same culture, and is an obstacle to a critical understanding of the 
world.3 For Lacan, the search for truth is the search for shit. Thus, I shall conjecture that 
perhaps cultural renewal is not enough if the purpose is to solve the impasses of school 
mathematics; and Brown’s notion of cultural renewal may end up functioning as another 
mechanism of repression of the role school mathematics plays within capitalist economics.  
I strongly support Brown’s research at the level of the criticism he develops on how 
mathematics education research tends to create an imaginary picture of school mathematics, 
and in the way he uses contemporary theory to shed light on how broader structures influence 
what is happening in the classroom. Brown’s aim is to develop a theorization – a 
symbolisation – where what he calls, drawing on Lacan, the real of schools can be taken into 
account. Brown is trying to symbolize what is usually silenced in research – i.e. the shit. I will 
argue, however, that the kind of symbolisation proposed by Brown falls short of giving an 
account of what I consider to be the real of schools: the worldwide accreditation system that 
runs indifferent to the didactical, curricular and even cultural innovations perpetrated by 
researchers, governors and practitioners. I will take support from Lacan’s reading of Marx 
(Lacan, 2007), where it is economy, not culture, that is the locus of change. A proper 
economic reading of school mathematics has been absent from the social and sociopolitical 
                                                          
2 Elsewhere (Pais, in press), I engage in a discussion that extends the debate between sociocultural theories 
(based on the recent articles of Presmeg and Radford (2008), Radford and Roth (2011), and Roth (2012)), and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. Namely, I discuss the dialectic involved in the way researchers conceive the relation 
between person and culture, or between psychology and sociology. My purpose here is not to enter into this 
debate, but provide instead a different interpretation of Lacan’s work from the one emerging from Brown’s 
theorizations around mathematics education and subjectivity. 
3 As Lacan (2008a, p. 74) said, in his own style, “if you want to do logic, or anything else to do with modern 
science, you have to start before you have been completely cretinized, by culture of course”, and he adds, 
“obviously, we are always a little cretinized because there is no escaping secondary school”.  
turns (Pais, 2014). By further pushing Brown’s theorization, I highlight the potential that 
Lacanian theory has to posit mathematics education as an element of a broader political and 
economic arrangement. Hence, this article follows on from my previous research where I 
sought to probe the way in which researchers conceive the importance of mathematics (Pais, 
2013; Pais & Valero, 2012). By outlining a theoretical framework whereby students’ learning 
could be understood not in terms of the inherent properties of mathematics, but in terms of 
the role this school subject plays within political economy, I seek to enrich the potential that 
social theory has to render problematic some of the taken-for-granted assumptions that 
prevail in the field. It is my contention that Lacanian theory offers us the possibility to renew 
mathematics education not just in itself – better classrooms practices, different 
understandings of what mathematics is and how it can be taught and learned – but also for 
itself, that is, to renew the way researchers conceive the importance of this school subject.  
 
2. The unconscious and the pacifying screen of ideology 
At the centre of Lacanian theory is the idea that language is the necessary condition for 
subjectivity. Through language as name-giving power, that is, through the emergence of what 
Lacan (2000) calls the symbolic order, the subject comes into being. The only way for a 
person to express their ‘being’ is through the symbolic order, through the logic of the 
signifier. This logic is independent of the subject that it represents. That is to say, the 
meaning of the ‘said’ does not belong to the person who says it, but is determined by the 
place it occupies within the signifier chain.  
It was Freud who first extensively explored this discrepancy between what the individual 
wants to say and what they actually say. According to Miller (1999) it is in this discrepancy 
that Freud situated what he called the unconscious: ‘as if for this wanting-to-say of mine, 
which is my “intention of signification”, another wanting-to-say was substituted, which 
would be that of the signifier itself and which Lacan designated as “the desire of the Other”’ 
(p. 2). This Other is not ‘outside’ the individual; rather it speaks through them. As Lacan 
stressed after Freud, the self is an Other, that there, where the subject speaks, an Other speaks 
for her (Fink, 1995, p. 1). Lacan’s assertion that “the unconscious is politics”4 means 
precisely that what we think to be the innermost core of our being – the level of desire – is not 
only unconscious but schematized by politics. Žižek (1994, 2012) concludes that it is 
                                                          
4 Lacan, seminar of May 10, 1967, in Le séminaire, Livre XIV: La logique du fantasme (unpublished). Quoted in 
Žižek (2012, p. 551).  
precisely ideology that organizes our desires, that teaches us what and how to desire. This is 
why Brown (2011) emphasises that the goal of his research with teachers is not to get at the 
intention of what the teachers say, but rather “to understand how the policy was operating 
through the teachers” (p. 84). 
Here resides the importance of putting under critical scrutiny the constructs of our own 
research, the speech of the teachers and the nature of students’ engagement with 
mathematics. It implies, as posed by Brown (2011, p. 109), a belief in the unconscious as this 
facet of human subjectivity that runs indifferent to the subject’s (conscious) knowledge. In 
other words, it implies an assumption that there is a perfectly articulated knowledge for 
which, strictly speaking, no subject is responsible. As posed by Lacan (1999), “the 
unconscious is presupposed on the basis of the fact that there is, somewhere in the speaking 
being, something that knows more about things than he does, but this is not an acceptable 
model of the world” (p. 88). Indeed, to assume that at the core of one’s subjectivity there is 
something that escapes our comprehension is not easy. Such a posture is becoming more 
difficult to assume since today’s leading ideology is one that obliterates the unconscious by 
conceiving the subject as an autonomous self-conscious one (Althusser, 2000; Miller, 2006).  
Within the Lacan–Žižek frame (which, for this matter, is not different from the 
Althusserian one), ideology is not a distorted representation of a true reality. Ideology is the 
reality, we are ‘naturally’ in ideology; our natural, immediate, sight is ideological. Thus the 
importance for Brown (2008a, p. 239) of questioning not only particular aspects of the 
teaching and learning of mathematics, but also what he calls, after Lacan, the big Other of 
mathematics education: the entire symbolic matrix organising our engagement in the field. In 
other words, Brown is calling attention to the importance of questioning the ideology 
sustaining mathematics education as a field of research.  
As noted by Brown (2008a, p. 239), this is a question that often remains understated. If 
we consider that ideology is a defence against some traumatic real, a “fantasy-screen” (Žižek, 
2008a, p. 7) set on putting order in a situation that otherwise will seem chaotic or impossible, 
then the question to be asked when carrying out an ideology critique is: which repressed real 
does a given ideology conceal? As rightly described by Brown (2011) in chapters 5 and 6, 
where he discusses Piaget, Vygotsky and Lacan, mathematics education research shows a 
propensity to disavow the actuality of the classroom. That is, mathematics education research 
is often looking at what Skovsmose (2005) calls a prototypical classroom and ignoring 
everything that somehow does not fit the picture of a well-organized and equipped class, with 
a teacher desiring to teach and students willing to learn. In much of the research into 
mathematics education, students and teachers are depicted as fully assuming the symbolic 
mandate conferred upon them. When problems appear they tend to be ignored by research, or 
‘solved’ through the implementation of a better practice. This is when research applies more 
to pre-fixed ideas of what is schooling, a teacher and a student, than to what Brown (2008a) 
calls the real of school, where factors such as “the quest to please the teacher; the satisfaction 
derived from particular relations with a teacher; the perverse pleasures achieved by those who 
paint themselves as mathematical illiterates, etc.” (Brown, 2008a, p. 239) make the daily lives 
of students and teachers. Perhaps we can say that the reigning ideology in mathematics 
education research is one that obliterates the real of schools for the sake of research.  
Brown’s work criticizes two of these research ideologies in mathematics education: 
constructivism (within a Piagetian trend) and socioculturalism (within a Vygotskian trend). 
Despite their differences, both constructivism and socioculturalism create an ideological 
shield set on effacing particularities of the learning process that somehow do not fit the 
encounter between a piece of mathematical content and a subject willing to learn it. Brown’s 
challenge is to symbolise these particularities, bring them into the research gaze. This is 
particularly evident in the research Brown does with teachers. However, symbolizing the real 
is an unlimited task. The symbolic is always lacking something. In Žižek’s words, an 
ideology – as a symbolic construct, a “social fantasy” (1992, p. 142) – is always a necessary 
counterpart to some real antagonism. Ideology is precisely the way the antagonistic fissure is 
masked (Žižek, 1992, p. 142). And, for Žižek, the social antagonistic fissure is first of all 
economic. How can we then posit the real of schools not just in terms of the pedagogical and 
didactical relation – that is, in terms of the difficulties and resistances of people when 
learning and teaching mathematics – but also in terms of the economic role that schools are 
asked to perform?  
 
3. Changing the object does not change the cause 
When referring to Damien Hirst’s piece, For the Love of God, Brown makes the point that the 
meaning of an object does not belong to the object as such, but is given by the “symbolic 
networks that assign meaning” (2011, p. 54) – Lacan’s symbolic order. These symbolic 
networks are economically determined: “our designations, subjectivations and self-definitions 
are inescapably quantified as a function of our exchange values and of our positioning in an 
economically defined world” (p. 54). By emphasizing economy as the inescapable world 
assigning meaning to our actions, Brown implicitly suggests that, if the purpose is to improve 
the teaching and learning of school mathematics, perhaps cultural renewal is not enough. The 
economy of schools has to be addressed. The question is: how far does Brown go in thinking 
change in terms of economic change?  
In order to tackle this question, one needs to address the crucial difference established by 
Lacan (e.g. 2004, 2008b) between object of desire – what someone desires – and the object 
cause of desire – what makes someone desire an object. For most mathematics education 
researchers, as well as for most teachers, the strategies to improve mathematics learning are 
centred in turning mathematics into the object of students’ desire. However, if we follow 
Lacan’s formulations, we have to acknowledge that the object in itself does not have the 
properties needed to become an object worthy of one’s desire. A subject desires an object not 
due to its particular characteristics (its applications, its beauty, its power to generalise, etc.) 
but because of the place such an object occupies within their libidinal economy. For many 
students it is not that they lose the object of their desire – mathematics. They have the object 
– they are students, thus dealing with mathematics on an almost daily basis – but they literally 
lose the desire for the object: they lose the object cause of desire. It is the cause – the entire 
frame needed for desire to be articulated – that determines what one desires. For students 
with problems with mathematics, what they miss is not (a meaningful) mathematics, but the 
entire symbolic articulation that makes it meaningful for them to learn mathematics. Thus, 
and this is the central Lacanian insight into mathematics education, if the purpose of research 
is to make mathematics meaningful for students, its work should be centred not in the object 
mathematics, but in the entire frame that schematizes what it signifies for a student to learn 
mathematics, that is, in what makes a student desire mathematics.  
What does make a student desire mathematics? At stake here is the fundamental 
sociopolitical structure of desire (Lacan, 2001; Žižek, 2008a). As Lacan (e.g. 2001) 
repeatedly asserted, desire is the desire of the Other, that is, far from coming from some 
‘inner will’, desire comes from raising the question ‘What does the Other want from me?’ As 
Brown shows us throughout his exploration of Lacanian theory, it is upon this primordial 
question that our relation towards others, our making sense of the world, is constituted. 
Strictly speaking, it is the Other that causes our desire. The question about students’ desire 
can be formulated thus: who is the Other who causes students’ desire to learn mathematics? 
For sure it is the dream of many mathematics educators to conceive mathematics itself as 
this Other: to believe that students’ engagement in mathematics is driven by the cultural-
historical attributes of a mathematical content – in the case of socioculturalism – or by the 
“pursuit of noticing or asserting generality” in the case of Brown’s theorization (2011, p. 
146). That is, to believe that mathematics as an object has already in itself the properties that 
will trigger students’ desire for learning. For many people who come across school 
mathematics, however, engagement in this subject does not derive from a ‘will to learn’, but 
from a will to satisfy some Other’s demand (say, parents’ demand for good grades, teachers’ 
demand for learning, academic or professional demands, etc.). It is an aspiration as pious as it 
is naive to assume that students will engage in mathematics for the satisfaction of exploring 
mathematics. It is the cause and not the object of desire that determines students’ engagement 
in mathematics. This cause has to be located not in intrinsic characteristics of mathematics 
nor in the innermost core of students’ being, but in politics; in what Brown calls, in the 
quotation at the beginning of this section, “the symbolic networks that assign meaning”. 
In the Žižekian field, it is ideology which organizes our desires, which teaches us what 
and how to desire. If, as Brown argues, today’s ideology is one that supports capitalism as an 
economic system, then the conclusion to be drawn – and this is Žižek’s main point 
concerning political economy – is that it is capital itself that schematizes our desire. The 
desire of the student for the object mathematics results from the sociopolitical demand for 
them to succeed or fail. This is the cause of their desire. If the student loses such a cause – the 
case of many students for whom mathematics means nothing in terms of future possibilities – 
there is no point in ornamenting the object mathematics, by doing investigations instead of 
routine exercises, for instance. Eventually, mathematics could become students’ object of 
desire, and become enjoyable. Nevertheless, first there has to be a cause.5  
Therefore, when Brown (2011) argues that “desire might be associated with the intrinsic 
excitement of mathematics to those who are absorbed in the mathematics as mathematics” (p. 
179), I fail to recognize Lacan’s notion of desire. Nobody is ever absorbed in mathematics as 
mathematics, in the same way that nobody is ever absorbed in sex as sex; that is, without 
some kind of minimal fantasy sustaining the sexual act. Desire needs symbolic articulation; it 
needs a cause more than an object. Ultimately the kind of object occupying the place of what 
Lacan calls object a – the cause of desire – is purely accidental. This minimal fantasy has to 
be sought not in one’s intrinsic excitement, but in the sociopolitical arena. As stressed by 
Brown “in Lacan’s model the human subject is always trying to please someone” (p. 183). 
                                                          
5 That is, a minimum of sociopolitical significance as articulated in the field of the Other: “jouissance 
[enjoyment] is questioned, evoked, tracked, and elaborated only on the basis of a semblance” (Lacan, 1999, p. 
92). This is true even for something apparently enjoyable in its own right: sex. As Žižek (2005) explores, even 
for the sexual act to take place, there has to be some kind of fantasy support. We cannot just ‘do it’; we have to 
narrativize it, ‘seeing’ ourselves doing it through the Other’s gaze.  
So, again, the question is: who is this ‘someone’ who students try to please when they are 
absorbed in mathematics as mathematics?  
 
4. Jouissance and surplus value 
In chapter 8 of his book, Brown introduces the Lacanian notion of jouissance or enjoyment to 
address the case of Brenda, a school teacher experiencing difficulties in occupying the 
official discourse, whilst reconciling it with more personal reflections made during the 
practitioner research process (she was also at the same time a doctorate student researching 
her own practice as a teacher). Brenda felt that her conceptions of what constituted a good 
education were not fitting well with the new official doctrine, centred on explicit achievement 
objectives: “how would I accommodate the mismatch between my perceived reality and this 
proposed ideology? Would it entail a change in my ideological stance? Or could I work with 
a mismatch?” (Speech of Brenda, quoted in Brown, 2011, p. 186). Yet, as explored by 
Brown, Brenda’s attempt at working through these conflicts led to some surprising results. 
Although Brenda, at one level, shows a distance from the official ideology – which imposes 
more control on teachers’ work, when in her practice she gets attached to this discourse as 
she finds some ‘pleasure’ – jouissance/enjoyment in Lacanese – in performing such 
prescribed tasks. In particular, she found pleasure in being praised by the inspector 
responsible for target-setting: “I [had] accepted an imposed idea that I felt did not really 
address educational improvement. Yet I gained pleasure through the praise I received about 
my competence” (Speech of Brenda, quoted in Brown, p. 187). Brown’s analysis of this 
episode, based on Žižek’s concept of ideology, is right to the point: ideology catches its 
subjects not through a rational conscious adherence to its ‘values’, but by means of an 
unconscious enjoyment. The attachment to something we know is ‘wrong’ can only be 
explained in terms of enjoyment: although the ideology has been exposed, we still do not 
change our behaviour because we enjoy it. In the case of Brenda, she knows very well the 
ideology of what Brown calls “administrative structures” (p. 171)6 behind the curriculum, 
nevertheless she enjoys playing her role.  
                                                          
6 Žižek’s more precise here: these ‘structures’ that determine teachers’ work are the structures of capitalist 
economics. Throughout the book, Brown never poses capital itself as the determining force colouring our action 
in the world. Although he discusses the commoditization of mathematics, the restrictions imposed on teachers 
and students by the need for accountability, and the administrative control imposed by governments, he never 
posits capital as the ‘concrete universal’ of our historical époque, that is, as something that “while it remains a 
particular formation, it overdetermines all alternative formations, as well as all noneconomic strata of social 
life” (Žižek, 2004, p. 3). The sense I get from reading Brown’s book is that capital gets watered down into a set 
of obstacles – administrative, bureaucratic, governmental – and personalised into groups of people – controlling 
Thus, when Brown says that ‘the renewal of mathematics is often in the hands of those 
controlling the curriculums, and wishing to exercise that control in the name of “raising 
standards”’ (p. 51), maybe he is overlooking the role of all of those who, while not really 
believing in those in power, keep acting as if they do. The problem is not a group of people 
that screw the system. As the case of Brenda shows, it is all of us that, although criticizing the 
system, keep acting accordingly. There is an unconscious attachment to the system as such.7 
As pointed out by Brown (2011, pp. 119–126), the Lacanian subject is a barred subject, it 
lacks something. This lack is, first of all, a lack of jouissance (Lacan, 1999, 2007), the lack of 
a real enjoyment which is always posited as something lost, a lost fullness, the part of 
ourselves that is castrated when we enter the symbolic system of language and social 
relations: “The means of jouissance are open on the principle that he has renounced this 
closed, foreign jouissance, renounced the mother” (Lacan, 2007, p. 78). This renunciation is 
concomitant to the emergence of the signifier. The jouissance that is sacrificed, lost, is not 
simply annihilated, vanished, but it shifts to the Other. Henceforth, it will be through the 
signifier chain that jouissance can be attained.8 As Lacan (1999) pointed out “the signifier is 
the cause of jouissance” (p. 24), and “knowledge is the means of jouissance” (2007, p. 89). 
The role of the symbolic order – the Law – is to divide up, distribute, or reattribute everything 
that counts as jouissance (Lacan, 1999, p. 3). This is precisely what the case of Brenda 
exemplifies. Brenda enjoys only by being caught in a signifying way; what she enjoys is not 
‘herself’ but a part of the Other’s body (in this case, the National Numeracy Strategy in 
Britain).  
In Seminar XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Lacan (2007) settled some of the 
most shattering connections between the dynamics of capitalism and the constitution of 
subjectivity.9 For Lacan (1999, 2007), the basic structural feature of subjectivity is that a lack 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the curriculum, seeking for accountability – that are then seen as malfunctions, contingent occurrences of an 
otherwise good system.  
7 This is a case of what Judith Butler calls a “passionate attachment” (Butler, 1997), where the very submission 
of oneself to discipline also produces libidinal activity. That is, the subject actually enjoys being submitted to 
disciplinary mechanisms. As phrased by Butler (1997), “the repressive law is not external to the libido that it 
represses, but the repressive law represses to the extent that repression becomes a libidinal activity” (p. 49, 
quoted in Žižek, 2008b, p. 300, my emphasis). This explains why people continue to be attached to discursive or 
ideological forms of submission, even after becoming completely aware of them. What binds us to explicit 
ideologies or discursive practices of subjectification is not a rational decision to do so, but an unconscious mode 
of enjoyment. 
8 Jouissance is a complicated term in Lacanian theory, and it is used in different ways to signify different things. 
Here I am referring to the jouissance of the signifier, the one that is attained through the symbolic disposition of 
language. I am not referring to the phallic jouissance, the raw flow of pleasure of the primordial father which 
relates with the signifier in a different way. See Lacan (1999, 2007).   
9 The basic feature uniting Marx’s theory of political economy and Freud’s psychoanalysis is the idea that there 
is something that overdetermines an individual’s acting in the world. Marx situated this overdetermination in 
or loss is generated which then circulates in the Other. This lack is jouissance itself, which 
Lacan equates with Marx’s notion of surplus value: “a certain day surplus jouissance became 
calculable, could be counted, totalized. This is where what is called the accumulation of 
capital begins” (2007, p. 177). What Marx denounces in surplus value is the spoliation of 
jouissance (p. 81). In Marx’s theory of political economy, the surplus value is that value 
resulting from the effectivisation of a worker’s labour that does not get back to the worker, 
but is instead transferred to the Other qua ‘free’ market. The employee never enjoys that 
surplus product: they ‘lose’ it. There is something that the worker has to lose, to alienate, if 
they want to engage in capitalist economics. The capitalist, as Other, enjoys that excess 
product, leaving the subject in the situation of working for the Other’s enjoyment, as Brenda 
does. As pointed out by Fink (1995, p. 96), “like surplus value, this surplus jouissance may 
be viewed as circulating “outside” of the subject in the Other”. In the same way that 
capitalism creates a loss in its field, which allows an enormous market mechanism to 
develop, the advent of subjectivity also creates a loss, and, for Freud as well as for Lacan, 
that loss is at the centre of civilization.  
However, in order to be efficient, workers’ loss needs to be articulated within an 
ideology that seeks to present capitalism as the meeting between equal parts in the free 
market. That is, as implying no loss at all. At the level of subjectivity, fantasy functions in 
very much the same way: it is the subject’s way of organizing their world without being 
constantly confronted with the trauma of the lost jouissance. The way Brenda organizes her 
libidinal economy as to actually enjoy performing controlling tasks can be described as a 
fantasy avoiding her confronting her deep discomfort with such educational politics, that is, 
from confronting her own desire.  
In his later seminars, Lacan (1999, 2007) nails down object a – the cause of desire – as 
surplus jouissance. The cause of our desire, what makes us desire what we desire, is 
schematized in the field of the Other’s jouissance. According to Lacan (2007, p. 201), the 
object cause of desire – object a – is the place Marx revealed as surplus value. In our 
contemporary society, it is the logic of capitalist economics that regulates jouissance. Surplus 
value stands for the object cause of desire, as that which is most highly prized and valued by 
the subject. As such, what Lacanian theory instigates us to do is to posit capital itself as the 
cause of students’ desire to learn mathematics as well as the cause of Brenda’s efforts to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
what he called the infrastructure, that is, the economic mode of production, while in Freud this 
overdetermination takes place at the level of the unconscious. Lacan’s reading of Marx in Seminar XVII brings 
together economy and unconscious into a unitary theoretical discourse.  
comply with the National Numeracy Strategy. Ultimately, this ‘Other’ that both students and 
teachers try to please when dealing with school mathematics is the capitalist system. 
Lacanian theory invites us to understand the nature of students’ engagement not in terms of 
the object mathematics, but in terms of the place this object occupies as a school subject that 
students need to pass in order to keep up with life. What students enjoy when doing 
mathematics is not mathematics itself, but what circulates in the Other as school credit.  
 
5. Fetishism and mathematics 
So, if we follow Lacanian theory, we are instigated to posit credit as the cause of students’ 
desire, and mathematics, with its power, utility, beauty and the like, as the necessary ideology 
masking the real – object a – of school’s credit system. This encourages us to take a certain 
critical distance towards the object mathematics. A distance enabling us to see mathematics 
not in itself, but as being articulated in the field of the Other – capital. 
Such a move, which concerns the relation between a structured network and one of its 
elements, is best rendered by Marx’s notion of commodity fetish (Marx, 1976). In capitalism, 
the value of a commodity is no longer defined by its use (by the ‘meaning’ it has for the 
people who use it), but by the place it occupies in the set of all commodities, which defines 
its exchange value. The fetishism arises when we misperceive the purely formal or structural 
determination of an object’s value as being a direct property of that object: “what is really a 
structural effect, an effect of the network of relations between elements, appears as an 
immediate property of one of the elements, as if this property also belongs to it outside its 
relation with other elements” (Žižek, 2008c, p. 19). Marx gives the example of the king to 
illustrate this misrecognition: “For instance, one man is king only because other men stand in 
the relation of subjects to him. They, on the contrary, imagine that they are subjects because 
he is king” (Marx, 1976, p. 82). The kingship of a king is a result of the network of social 
relations between a ‘king’ and his ‘subjects’, however, 
 
to the participants of this social bond, the relationship appears necessarily in an 
inverse form: they think that they are subjects giving the king royal treatment because 
the king is already in himself, outside the relationship to his subjects, a king; as if the 
determination of 'being-a-king' were a 'natural' property of the person of a king. 
(Žižek 2008c, p. 20) 
 
The fetishist misrecognition consists in believing that the attributes of a given element are the 
result of some direct characteristics of this element, and not an effect of the place this element 
occupies within a given set of social relations. 
As I explore elsewhere (Pais, 2013), the reasons invoked to justify the importance of 
mathematics in schools are conceived in terms of its inherent characteristics, whether they are 
related to the development of mental functions, the utility of this school subject for people’s 
lives, its beauty, cultural richness, or the ideals of citizenship. Mathematics seems to embody 
the right properties that make it important. Yet what we perceive as the direct properties of 
mathematics are indeed a result of the place this subject occupies within capitalist schooling. 
As Brown (2011) says, “the signifier, or name, stands in for, even produces, the object it 
seeks to locate” (p. 15). This means that the attributes of an object – Lacan’s enunciated 
content – do not belong to the object itself, but are produced by the place this object occupies 
within a given symbolic formation – Lacan’s place of enunciation. As such, when Brown 
says that “the signifier of test performance has become at least as important as the signified 
mathematical capabilities” (p. 59), he is underestimating the power of the signifier over the 
signified. It is not that there is a signified ‘mathematical capabilities’ that have been 
corrupted by the signifier of ‘test performance’. As stated by Brown above, the signifier 
produces the object, that is, it is the capitalist logic of test performance that produces the 
(ideology) of the importance of mathematics as ‘capability’. The belief in the power of 
mathematics in optimizing the mundane lives of individuals or in allowing students to 
understand “the discipline’s aesthetic qualities and in finding ways to enable our students to 
share these pleasures” (p. 59) functions as an ideological screen that simultaneously conceals 
its motives whilst making them actual and effective. 
However, the notion of commodity fetish is not only about misperception. As noticed by 
Marx, a fetish persists even after its illusory nature has become transparent: the “discovery 
[of the illusionary character of a commodity], while removing all appearance of mere 
accidentality from determination of the magnitude of the values of products, yet in no way 
alters the mode in which that determination takes place” (Marx, 1976, p. 166). We may very 
well recognize an ideological fiction as a fiction, but nevertheless this fiction still works. In 
other words, we may very well know that our economic system is unfair, that schools are 
subjected to economic pressures, but nonetheless its functioning is real, i.e. it does not 
depend on our knowledge of it. 
Researchers today know that mathematics serves other purposes than the ones preached 
by researchers and governments in terms of knowledge and competences. The fields of 
ethnomathematics, critical mathematics education and, more generally, what have been 
known as the social, cultural and political perspectives in mathematics education have shown 
how mathematics is involved in processes of social selection, in excluding groups of people 
considered to be disadvantaged, or in providing a clear social mechanism of accountability 
and accreditation. A recent special issue on social theory published in this journal 
contemplates research where it is shown how mathematics is used as an economic measure 
(Tsatsaroni & Evans, 2013), a technology of subjectification (Kanes, Morgan & Tsatsaroni, 
in press) or as a mechanism of social selection (Jorgensen, Gates & Roper, 2013). These 
studies compel us to think about the importance of mathematics not in terms of object 
mathematics – as valuable knowledge and competence – but in terms of the role it plays and 
its attendant submissions to political as well as economic criteria and goals. However, when 
researching research (Pais & Valero, 2012), particularly research streaming from the social 
and sociopolitical turn, we notice how researchers, notwithstanding knowing that 
mathematics is used in schools as an accreditation instrument, nevertheless insist on the 
importance of mathematics as knowledge and competence. In this mechanism of fetishist 
disavowal (Žižek, 2008b) one knows, but one does not really believe what one knows, and 
thus keeps acting as if one does not know. 
As a result, researchers proceed by identifying what Lundin (2011) calls the missing link 
– what is standing in the way of a meaningful and successful mathematics for all – and design 
strategies to overcome it. For some researchers the missing link is the lack of real-life 
problems in the teaching of mathematics (Pais, 2013), for others it is the lack of attention to 
students’ culture (Pais, 2011), while for others the problem could be a lack of critical 
mathematics (Pais, Fernandes, Matos & Alves, 2012). In Brown’s theorization, emphasis is 
given to “generating new stories, of defining new generalisations, with counting new entities 
as one [...] and with mapping out the domain of mathematics in novel and unexpected ways” 
(2011, p. 167), and in how this cultural renewal can be “distributed across the population as a 
wider attitude to teaching and learning” (p. 144). Brown posits the locus of change in 
mathematics itself. It is by transforming the object mathematics, and the entire pedagogy and 
didactics involved in the teaching and learning of this subject, that a change in the problem of 
failure can be achieved. Instead of conceiving failure as a real necessity of current schooling, 
research ends up creating ideological injunctions whose result is to mask the place 
mathematics occupies within schooling. 
As I explored earlier, within Lacanian theory, what one desires is not the immediate 
thing, but what in it is more than itself: “I love you, but, because inexplicably I love in you 
something more than you – the object petit a – I mutilate you” (Lacan, 2004, p. 263). One 
desires mathematics, but there is something in mathematics – object a, the credit attached to 
this school subject – that one desires more, so one destroys mathematics. What makes 
students desire mathematics is what in mathematics is more than itself: the object cause of 
desire, the school credit attached to this school subject. The same happens to many teachers: 
they want to teach mathematics, but they want even more their students to pass, so they 
destroy mathematics – doing routine exercise, meaningless ‘real’ problems, etc. – for the sake 
of the credit given by the exam. As the example of Brenda shows, this happens even if the 
teacher is fully aware that promoting ‘teaching to pass’ is a deficient way of learning 
mathematics. Theoretical knowledge does not abolish practical fetishism. 
   
6. Is cultural renewal enough? 
The discrepancy between an element and its place in a structure, between enunciated and 
enunciation, or between what we know and what we do (and enjoy) sheds a new light into 
Brown’s notion of cultural renewal as an emancipatory force in mathematics education. The 
question to be raised is how the idea of cultural renewal as proposed by Brown may end up 
making more effective what it criticizes – the increasing commoditization of education. Or, to 
paraphrase Žižek (2008a, p. 56), how can the enunciated rejection of an ideological 
hegemony involve the full endorsement of this same hegemony at the level of the 
enunciation? At stake here is the Lacanian premise that the existence of an object requires a 
place for it to exist – a ‘world’ in Badiou’s terms (Brown, 2011, p.148) – of which the object 
is a function. A mathematical object in a school is not the same as a mathematical object in 
the working sheet of a mathematician. What makes them different are the different worlds 
they inhabit. A student is first and foremost a student, frequenting a specific place called 
school, with particular rules and organisation of labour. Research insights such as ‘realistic 
mathematics’, ‘local mathematics’, ‘critical mathematics’ or, in the case of Brown, ‘counting-
as-one’ are going to be implemented in schools – the position of enunciation. The latter 
determines the true content of these insights, so that, in the end, it becomes difficult to 
imagine how these suggestions can change any of the core features of the school’s credit 
system. To believe that our enunciated intentions are going to be implemented in schools 
without some kind of ‘misrecognition’ is to neglect the crucial role that the signifier has in 
attributing meaning that was not intended by the subject. As mentioned before, within 
Lacanian theory, the subject is represented, and it is the logic of this representation – the 
logic of the signifier – that determines the subject’s intentions. What does prevent Brown’s 
idea of ‘counting-as-one’ becoming commoditized, and thus utterly determined by the place 
of enunciation?10 
This is where I prefer to posit the dimension of truth that Brown brings up in his book: in 
the gap between the enunciated content and the position of enunciation. The truth of Brown’s 
cultural renewal is the way his proposal is going to be placed in the enunciation – that is, in 
schools. How the real of school mathematics will articulate and make ‘liveable’ a proposal 
such as the one of ‘cultural renewal’? The basic premise of Brown’s approach is that culture  
has the power to “shape and renew the mathematics we encounter in schools” (2011, p. 167). 
However, for Lacan, culture functions not in the sense of renewal but in the sense of 
‘reaction’, as an ideology set to conceal some traumatic real. Could ‘cultural renewal’ 
become another ideology concealing the real economic dimension of school mathematics? As 
pointed out by Žižek (2006, p. 348), since dominant social systems demand perpetual reforms 
as a means of integrating what could be new and potential emancipatory acts into well-
established social structures, the system may very well use Brown’s idea of ‘cultural renewal’ 
as a way to satisfy the societal demand for reforming mathematics education, while ensuring 
that these ideas will not actually change any of the core features of the school system. It is in 
this sense that Žižek says that today's capitalism needs to promote constant reforms and 
innovations to conceal the crude reality that core choices (such as a change in the economic 
mode of production; or a valorisation of work instead of knowledge when evaluating 
students, as proposed by Baldino and Cabral (2006)) are not available. 
The crucial insight from Lacanian psychoanalysis, as I discussed before, is that the cause 
of students’ desire is not articulated in terms of culture, but in terms of economy. It is not 
because one makes a cultural renewal that one has thereby done away with credit as the cause 
of students’ desire. The symbolic machinations produced by mathematics education research 
have to address the real: the fact that there is something in school mathematics that cannot be 
reduced to knowledge. There is something real about schools functioning in the strict 
Lacanian sense: as something that never changes, something that does not depend on our idea 
                                                          
10 Imagining, for instance, an entire exam industry developing tests capable of evaluating students’ capacity for 
generalizing, ‘counting as one’ inasmuch as PISA has become the ultimate examination designed to evaluate 
students’ use of mathematics in everyday activities. Such a ‘commoditization’ has been happening with ideas 
coming from ethnomathematics (Pais, 2011) and critical mathematics education (Pais, Fernandes, Matos & 
Alves, 2012), two fields that are highly critical towards existing school mathematics. When ideas from these 
fields came into schools, instead of changing the current state of affairs, they ended up being completely co-
opted by the logic of school accreditation. That happens because capitalism is in our days the place of 
enunciation, the place where the ultimate meaning of our enunciated intentions is determined. 
of it. This something is the unconscious itself: knowledge that does not know itself (Lacan, 
1999, p. 98). When Brown suggests that students’ learning should be driven not by credit but 
by the quest for experiencing the eternity of mathematics’ truth (Brown, 2011, p. 137), he is 
asking students to ‘forget’– repress – the truth of schooling, and be focused on the truth of 
mathematics. In other words, he is asking students to forget their places of enunciation, their 
unconscious. But the entire purpose of the psychoanalytical act is precisely the opposite. It 
seeks to ‘make the unconscious talk’ by bringing into consciousness what has hitherto been 
repressed. And what has been repressed in mathematics education research is precisely the 
importance of this subject within a school’s credit system.  
 
7. What could an economic renewal mean? 
Chapter 7 of Brown’s book – ‘The Cultural Renewal of Mathematical Learning’ – is arguably 
the most experimental and challenging part of the book. Here, Brown (2011) goes into 
Badiou’s philosophy, its relation with Lacan, and how the distinction between truth and 
knowledge might be understood in mathematics education. The main point of Brown’s 
engagement with Badiou concerns the possibility that the latter gives of centring teaching on 
experimentation and critique rather than the delivery of existing knowledge. This poses 
important questions for our work as educators: “do we conceptualize our task in terms of 
initiating our students into existing knowledge? More radically, our task can be seen as 
troubling the certainties of that knowledge” (p. 138). 
Brown is bringing into mathematics education the crucial question posed by Badiou 
apropos of philosophy: how does true change occur in a given situation? (Bosteels, 2006, p. 
158). As a good Marxist, Brown knows that a true change in schooling is more a political 
than an educational matter. Chapter 8 of his book – ‘The Political Shaping of Mathematical 
Learning’ – describes how broader structures impact in decisive ways what is going on in 
schools. However, this last chapter contrasts with the examples explored by Brown 
throughout the book of what a change or renewal could mean for school mathematics. 
Although Brown acknowledges that the most important obstacles in achieving this renewal 
are structural ones, having to do with “administrations trying to administer populations of 
teachers and children with more or less predictable results against a register of externally 
defined standards” (p. 168), he assumes that school mathematics “is not located in a settled 
environment and its norms can be challenged” (p. 168). The question is: which norms and 
how can they be challenged? Brown suggests that the norms of schooling can be confronted 
by challenging ways of thinking that trap us into past ways of making sense (p. 144). 
Through experimentation and critique, students and teachers can develop ways of working in 
the mathematics classroom that are not so easily regulated and assessed by governments (p. 
142). It is assumed that such a cultural change will lead to a change in the governing of 
schools, albeit uncertain. This change is in the hands of students and teachers: 
 
Lacan’s conception of truth, as always being new, proposes for the teacher an 
educational alternative to being a mere purveyor of everyday discourse. Lacan’s 
optimistic conclusion sees perpetual renewal as the mode of life that teacher and her 
students must live. (p. 168) 
 
The paragraph continues with insights on how teachers can break the clutches of present 
cultural configurations, towards a future beyond their conceptions. Such a hysterical demand 
on teachers (Pais, 2012), who are seen as agents of change, notwithstanding all the socio-
political constraints explored by Brown, contradicts his critique of mathematics education 
research:  
 
Mathematics education research has had a tendency to be targeted at teachers, teacher 
educators and researchers and this activity masks us from the limited impact that it 
has. Such research can only ever reach a small proportion of such individuals 
restricting any process of dissemination. Yet even the capacity such individuals have 
for impact on broader states of affairs in mathematical learning must be questioned. 
Politicians and government administrators can often have more influence on the shape 
of mathematical learning in school through dealing with populations rather than 
individuals, social organisation through policy directives, rather than face to face 
encounters. Mathematics education research needs to be attentive to how such 
handling of populations impacts on broader conceptions of subjectivity and how we 
might impact on the factors that shape this subjectivity. (Brown, 2008a, p. 243) 
 
Indeed, what some of the examples depicted by Brown show is that a change in mathematics 
education has to be located not in a group of well-intentioned and informed teachers, but in 
the broader structural arrangements that determine teachers’ work.11 These broader 
arrangements are not cultural, but are located in what Marxists call the economic 
infrastructure, that runs indifferent to cultural changes. If we are thinking of a true change in 
the sense of Badiou, we should ask what it could mean for a change not only in the culture 
but also in the economy of schooling. 
The first step will be to acknowledge that when people go to school they get introduced 
not only to a culture, but also to an economy (Baldino & Cabral, 2006, 2013; Lave & 
McDermott, 2002; Pais, 2012). We all agree that “the encounter with mathematics is a 
formative experience for the individual” (Brown, 2011, p. 144). The interesting question is 
how we conceive the nature of this formative experience. If we restrict our ‘world’, to use 
Badiou’s term, to the ‘world of mathematics’, then the importance of this formative 
experience will be understood in terms of the mathematical experience alone, whether in 
terms of the usefulness that mathematics has in our daily life, in terms of the appropriation of 
cultural forms, or, as in the case of Brown, the opportunity to develop a sense of critique and 
experimentation towards mathematics. But if we posit mathematics within the ‘world of 
schooling’, then students learn many other things as part of their formative experience with 
mathematics. As Baldino and Cabral (1998, 2006, 2013) have been showing through their 
own experience as mathematics teachers, students in a mathematics class (as in any other 
class) learn above all to participate in and accept the conditions of production and seizure of 
surplus value. They learn the (unconscious) laws that regulate their jouissance. They learn 
that jouissance can only be attained through the Other, that is, through school’s accreditation 
system. If we are talking about truth in terms of “a process that breaks decisively with all 
established criteria for judging (or interpreting) the validity (or profundity) of opinions (or 
understandings)…” (Hallward, 2003, pp. xxiii–xxiv, quoted in Brown, 2011, p. 136), then to 
experience school mathematics’ truth one will also have to contemplate a break with existing 
practices of school accreditation. From what is available in Brown’s text, no change was 
made in the way mathematics appears in school as a subject that students need to pass by 
                                                          
11 Some parts of Brown’s text evince a contradiction in the way he understands the concept of ideology. On the 
one hand, when he analyses the case of Brenda, he is well aware that ideology is not in the hands of a group of 
people, orchestrating our lives as if we were puppets, but is inherently dependent on the subjects who, while not 
really believing in it, keep acting as if they do. However, in others parts of the text, he seems to conceive 
ideology as an attribute of a group of people who use it in a conscious way to exert power over others (see, for 
instance, p. 167). I suggest that we should stick to Althusser’s idea that ideology has no outside, we are always 
in it, not by a conscious decision to do so, but by the way we enjoy being in it. Capital exerts its power not by 
means of a conscious decision by the ones in power, but through the distribution of simple pleasures that keep 
people captive. 
means of attaining credit. There are always ‘established criteria’ that cannot be broken, 
notwithstanding all the cultural breaks that, as some of Brown’s examples show, can indeed 
occur. 
To break with the school’s credit system is not only hard, it is also unthinkable within the 
existing sociopolitical order. But then, if we follow Žižek’s notion of an act (1992) – which 
resembles Badiou’s notion of an event – such a break is precisely what characterizes a ‘true 
change’, a change that from the standpoint of the existing symbolic order is seen as 
impossible. To recover our previous discussion on desire, an act changes not only (or 
necessarily) the object of desire – in our case, mathematics – but the entire frame that makes a 
subject desire an object – the cause of desire, the credit system. A true act in mathematics 
education will have to involve a change in the way students are evaluated and promoted in 
schools. This is not an easy position to take. By means of an act a subject puts at stake 
everything, including themselves, their symbolic identity. If we take the case of Brenda, an 
act will be a clear refusal to participate in the National Numeracy Strategy, with all the 
consequences that this would have for her life, which can include losing her job. For a teacher 
an act could be a denial to be an agent of exclusion, by refusing to continue stamping people 
with numbers and letters. This is, of course, an unattainable position for anyone who wants to 
be a teacher. This is why Žižek (1992, p. 51) characterizes an act as always implying a 
‘crime’, a transgression’, namely to the limit of the symbolic community to which one 
belongs. The argument of this paper shows that the limits of mathematics education research 
are the limits of cultural change. Once one suggests a change in the economic role of schools, 
things get ‘impossible’. 
 
8. Final remarks 
Brown explores a diverse array of situations where it becomes evident that there is more in 
school mathematics than mathematics itself. Solving the impasses of school mathematics – 
failure, meaningless training, instrument of accountability, etc. – requires a change that goes 
beyond the limits of mathematics education. However, and notwithstanding Brown’s 
recognition that the problems the community faces are sociopolitical ones, the way he 
conceives change is located in mathematics. The cultural renewal proposed by Brown is the 
renewal of mathematics, its teaching and learning. By reading Brown’s book, I sense that 
turning mathematics into students’ object of desire is a matter of making mathematics more 
pleasant, critical and experimental. But one of the central lessons of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
is that students’ desire is articulated in the field of the Other. And today’s Other is capital, the 
place of enunciation where the meaning of our actions is defined. As such, Brown omits to 
give an account of credit as the object cause of students’ desire. While in some parts of the 
book Brown seems to posit mathematics in the ‘world’ of schooling, with all the institutional, 
curricular, and economic constraints that such a world imposes on the teaching and learning 
of this school subject, when thinking about renewal and change, the ‘world’ seems to be the 
world of mathematics, with its pursuit of noticing or asserting generality. The real that 
remains unaddressed in Brown’s proposal of cultural renewal is the real of school’s credit 
system. A real disguised by the fantasy of a pleasurable, enjoyable, experimental and critical 
mathematics.  
I know Brown has been accused of presenting a pessimistic view of mathematics 
education (Presmeg & Radford, 2008). Yet he is not pessimistic enough. He still has faith in 
changing the economy of school mathematics by changing its culture. The task is harsher 
than that, I argue. It implies an act, in the strict Žižekian sense, as an intervention into the real 
after which nothing remains the same (Žižek, 1992, p. 52), including school’s credit system. 
In the current matrix of world social organization this does not seem possible. Yet a radical 
use of social theory in mathematics education gains from conceiving the importance of 
mathematics not in terms of mathematics itself, but in terms of the place this subject occupies 
within a given structural arrangement. There is something inherently wrong in the way 
researchers use social theory, and still behave as ambassadors of mathematics. No matter how 
much we would like mathematics to be an adventure into knowledge, the ultimate problem-
solving technology or a crucial dimension of critical citizenship, this is not what school 
mathematics is. I suggest that school mathematics should be investigated as a crucial element 
of today’s political and economic landscape, and not so much, as it is today, as a precious 
knowledge aimed to empower people and to enable societal development. 
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